The Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in Madras Bar Association v. Union of India stands as one of the most important constitutional rulings on tribunal independence in recent years. It arrives after decades of ongoing tension between the judiciary and the executive over the structure; composition and functioning of tribunals bodies that increasingly handle disputes once adjudicated by High Courts.
At the centre of the controversy lies the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, enacted by Parliament to overhaul the tribunal system and centralise appointment and service condition rules. While presented as a reform aimed at efficiency and uniformity, the Act revived several provisions earlier struck down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, particularly in the series of Madras Bar Association judgments. This set the stage for yet another confrontation, leading to the 2025 ruling.
The judgment does not declare the Act unconstitutional in its entirety. Instead, the Hon’ble Court carefully dissects its provisions, striking down some, modifying others, and reinforcing a larger constitutional message: “Tribunal independence is a non-negotiable feature of India’s democratic structure. If tribunals are to serve as substitutes for High Courts in specialised domains, they must be insulated from executive control”.
Understanding the Constitutional stakes:
The case brought into focus the delicate architecture of India’s constitutional design. Tribunals sit at the crossroads between the judiciary and the executive. Parliament has the power to create them, but when they begin to take over the work of courts, the judiciary insists that certain principles particularly independence and impartiality must be preserved.
The Petitioners argued that many provisions of the 2021 Act represented a direct attempt to undo earlier Supreme Court judgments. These included the short four-year tenure for tribunal members, the age bar of 50 years for appointments, executive dominance in search-cum-selection committees, and broad rule-making powers given to the Central Government. The Union of India countered that Parliament cannot be compelled to legislate according to judicial directions and that these matters fell squarely within legislative policy.
Yet, as the judgment explains, while Parliament is free to legislate, it must do so within constitutional limits. The Supreme Court’s earlier directives in tribunal cases were not policy suggestions but safeguards aimed at preserving judicial independence.
A Long Trail of Tribunal Jurisprudence
To fully understand the present verdict, one must appreciate the lineage of tribunal jurisprudence stretching back nearly four decades. This begins with Sampath Kumar in 1987, where the Court first accepted tribunals as substitutes for High Courts, subject to adequate independence. A decade later, in L. Chandra Kumar, the Court re-established the supervisory role of High Courts, holding that tribunal decisions are always subject to writ jurisdiction.
However, the most significant contributions came from the series of Madras Bar Association judgments starting in 2010. The first of these, MBA (I), laid down the golden principles governing tribunal independence: the need for judicial dominance in selection, the importance of long tenures, the proper balance between judicial and technical members, and the impermissibility of allowing civil servants to retain liens with parent departments while serving on tribunals.
These ideas were reinforced in later decisions such as MBA (II) and MBA (III), which struck down legislative attempts to dilute appointment standards or introduce executive-heavy selection committees. The Constitution Bench in Rojer Mathew (2019) further emphasized that independence begins with who is appointed, how they are appointed, and the conditions under which they serve.
The Supreme Court’s Analysis in 2025:
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court in 2025 examined the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021. The Court methodically evaluated the various provisions and their impact on tribunal autonomy.
- Tenure: Short Terms Are a Threat to Independence:
The Act’s four-year tenure for tribunal members was one of the most contentious provisions. The Court found it wholly inconsistent with the long line of precedents that insisted on longer tenures. As the judgment notes, a short tenure discourages competent candidates’ particularly younger advocates or judges from accepting appointments. More importantly, short terms heighten the risk of executive influence, since members may remain anxious about reappointment.
The Court therefore held the four-year tenure unconstitutional and directed that the minimum tenure must be five years, with the existing retirement ages (70 for Chairpersons, 67 for Members) maintained.
- Age Bar of 50 Years: A Barrier to Talent
The Act prohibited the appointment of anyone below the age of fifty, which effectively excluded younger advocates and judicial officers who might otherwise seek tribunal positions. The Court rejected this restriction, noting that the Constitution itself treats advocates with ten years of practice as eligible for High Court judgeship. If such advocates can sit as High Court judges, they are certainly capable of serving as tribunal members.
The Court directed that advocates with 10 years of practice should be eligible for appointment, and that the Search-cum-Selection Committee must evaluate candidates based on their specialization and experience in relevant branches of law.
- The Composition of Search-cum-Selection Committees
One of the most critical aspects of tribunal independence concerns who selects tribunal members. The Act gave the executive considerable weight in the composition of the SCSC. The Court found this unacceptable. It reaffirmed that:
- The Chief Justice of India or his nominee must chair the SCSC.
- The Secretary of the parent ministry may participate only as a Member-Secretary without voting rights.
- Judicial members (including retired judges) must be present to ensure independence.
- The Government cannot choose from a panel of names. The SCSC must recommend only one name per vacancy, except for a one-person waiting list.
By tightening the structure of the committee, the Court sought to eliminate the possibility of executive preference playing a role in judicial appointments.
- Delegated Legislation and Essential Functions:
The Act vested substantial rule-making power in the Central Government, including power to prescribe qualifications. The Court held “that qualifications for judicial members are an essential legislative function, and delegating them without clear guidance violates constitutional principles”. While the executive may frame rules on allowances or procedure, it cannot be given unchecked power over eligibility criteria.
- Termination of Sitting Members under Section 33 of the Impugned Act:
The Act terminated the tenure of sitting members of certain tribunals and transferred proceedings. The Court did not strike down this provision, acknowledging the power of Parliament to restructure tribunal systems. However, it noted that such changes must be accompanied by compensation and must not be used to undermine independence.
The National Tribunals Commission: A Long-Awaited Reform
One of the most significant parts of the judgment is the Court’s reiteration that India urgently needs an independent National Tribunals Commission. The Commission is intended to serve as an autonomous body overseeing appointments, service conditions, discipline, infrastructure and finances of tribunals. The Court directed the Union of India to begin the process of establishing the Commission and, as an interim measure, to create a separate Tribunals Wing under the Ministry of Finance.
If implemented sincerely, the Commission could bring structural coherence to a system currently spread across multiple ministries, often leaving tribunals dependent on the very government departments that appear before them.
The Broader Significance of the Judgment:
The said verdict does more than correct defects in a statute; it reaffirms the constitutional principle that independence of adjudicatory bodies is essential for the rule of law. The judiciary has now repeatedly expressed concern that tribunals, which were envisioned as efficient and specialised substitutes for courts, risk becoming extensions of the executive.
By striking down the four-year tenure, removing the 50-year age bar, restoring judicial primacy in appointments, and setting limits on delegated power, the Court has re-established boundaries that the legislature cannot cross. The judgment also underscores a broader vision: tribunals must not be seen as retirement shelters or administrative conveniences but as robust, credible judicial institutions.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court’s judgment in Madras Bar Association v. Union of India is a watershed moment in India’s tribunal jurisprudence. It reiterates a constitutional truth that has been repeated across decades: tribunals, if they are to replace High Courts in specific fields, must embody the same independence, competence, and integrity that the judiciary represents.
The decision ensures that tribunal appointments remain insulated from executive control, that tenures are long enough to preserve independence, and that younger advocates and judicial officers are not excluded from opportunities to serve. Going forward, the success of India’s tribunal system will depend largely on how faithfully these principles are implemented and whether the long-awaited National Tribunals Commission finally sees the light of day.