The Munir Doctrine: How a Constitutional Coup Redefined Power in Pakistan
The Discreet Rise of a New Guard
When General Asim Munir was appointed as Chief of Army Staff of the Pakistani Army, many at home and abroad believed him to be a figure of the old guard. His early public image reinforced this perception—stiff, disciplined, and meticulously formal, with the serious disposition of a man who carefully concealed his ambitions.
Unlike previous Pakistani Army Chiefs who cultivated bold, charismatic, and at times theatrical personas, Munir’s approach was entirely different: quiet, calculated, and strategically individualistic. While his predecessors often aimed for the Presidency as the ultimate prize, Munir pursued a far more sophisticated plan.
Rather than seeking civilian office—a move that would have provoked uproar—he focused on consolidating military power from within. He envisioned control not from a presidential palace, but through a newly empowered military command structure, placing himself at its apex.
The Constitutional Gambit: Engineering the CDF
This ambition materialized through one of Pakistan’s most controversial constitutional amendments—the 27th Amendment, which created a powerful new office:
Chief of Defence Forces (CDF)
This single constitutional change radically altered Pakistan’s governance structure.
Key consequences included:
Granting the CDF supreme authority over the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
Dissolving the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, removing internal military checks.
Beginning Munir’s five-year term as CDF immediately.
Allowing for two consecutive terms, enabling a potential 10-year command.
Transforming a military office—traditionally subordinate to civilian leadership—into a supreme constitutional authority.
Through this legal maneuver, General Munir leveraged both national and international networks to expand his influence under the cover of constitutional legitimacy.
Exploiting Crisis: A Strategic Opening
Munir’s ascent accelerated during regional turbulence. India’s abrogation of Article 370 in 2019 created heightened tensions across South Asia. Munir seized this moment to argue for stronger centralized military control, portraying it as essential for Pakistan’s security and stability.
This approach, described as a “medical fundamentalist attitude,” treated the Constitution like a patient to be dissected and restructured to advance personal and institutional power.
The move raised critical questions about Pakistan’s civil–military relations. The military uniform, the author suggests, has become a tool for imposing national security doctrines that overshadow the mandate of the civilian government.
A Quiet Constitutional Coup
A key question remains:
Why has there been so little domestic or international protest?
The answer lies in Munir’s strategy.
He did not seize power through tanks, arrests, or forced takeovers.
He used constitutional engineering.
No dramatic coup.
No bloodshed.
No emergency broadcast.
He rewrote the rules from within the system—executing a silent constitutional coup that fundamentally rebalanced Pakistan’s political order.
The New Power Hierarchy
Pakistan now functions under a modified hierarchy:
The President retains symbolic authority.
The civilian government operates but remains overshadowed.
The CDF stands at the apex of military and political decision-making.
Munir’s authority shapes national policy, defence posture, and regional strategy.
The effect is profound: General Munir has become the central conductor of Pakistan’s political orchestra, with democratic institutions functioning largely in supporting roles.
Conclusion
The Munir Doctrine represents a turning point in Pakistan’s constitutional and political evolution. It illustrates a modern form of authoritarianism—one achieved not through force, but through legality, amendments, and institutional restructuring.
For Pakistan, the future is defined by a more centralized, militarized structure of governance.
For its neighbors and the international community, this shift
